

CHAPTER 17

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS

A. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

- [17:1](#) Elements of Liability
- [17:2](#) Probable Cause — Defined
- [17:3](#) Probable Cause Not Dependent on Result of Criminal Case
- [17:4](#) Presence of Malice
- [17:5](#) Proof of Malice
- [17:6](#) Lack of Probable Cause Not to Be Inferred from Malice Alone
- [17:7](#) Affirmative Defense — Advice of Attorney
- [17:8](#) Affirmative Defense — Advice of Prosecuting Attorney
- [17:9](#) Actual Damages

B. ABUSE OF PROCESS

- [17:10](#) Elements of Liability
- [17:11](#) Actual Damages
- [17:12](#) Ulterior Purpose — Defined

A. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

17:1 ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY

For the plaintiff, (*name*), to recover from the defendant, (*name*), on (*insert applicable pronoun*) claim of malicious prosecution, you must find that all of the following have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence:

- 1. A criminal case was brought against the plaintiff;**
- 2. The criminal case was brought as a result of (an) oral or written statement(s) made by the defendant;**
- 3. The criminal case ended in favor of the plaintiff;**
- 4. The defendant's statement(s) against the plaintiff (was) (were) made without probable cause;**
- 5. The defendant's statement(s) against the plaintiff (was) (were) motivated by malice towards the plaintiff; and**
- 6. As a result of the criminal case, the plaintiff had damages.**

If you find that any one or more of these (*number*) statements has not been proved, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

On the other hand, if you find that all of these (*number*) statements have been proved, (then your verdict must be for the plaintiff) (then you must consider the defendant's affirmative defense(s) of [*insert any affirmative defense that would be a complete defense to plaintiff's claim*]).

If you find that (this affirmative defense has) (any one or more of these affirmative defenses have) been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

However, if you find that (this affirmative defense has not) (none of these affirmative defenses have) been proved, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff.

Notes on Use

1. Because criminal cases are more frequently the basis for malicious prosecution claims, this instruction and the remaining instructions in this Part A have been drafted for use in malicious prosecution actions arising out of criminal, rather than civil, cases. The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized, however, that a malicious prosecution action may be based on a prior civil action, implying that the elements of liability are the same. **Hewitt v. Rice**, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007) (citing this instruction with approval and holding that plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution based on filing notice of lis pendens required showing that action

underlying notice of lis pendens was terminated in favor of plaintiff); *see also* **Thompson v. Md. Cas. Co.**, 84 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2004); **Westfield Dev. Co. v. Rifle Inv. Assocs.**, 786 P.2d 1112 (Colo. 1990) (filing of lis pendens in civil action may be actionable as malicious prosecution); **Slee v. Simpson**, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932); **Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst.**, 2022 COA 109M, ¶¶ 55, 63, 522 P.3d 242 (for an administrative proceeding to qualify as a prior action that may give rise to a malicious prosecution claim, it must be quasi-judicial in nature and have the power to take action adversely affecting the legally protected interests of the subject of the complaint); **Waskel v. Guar. Nat’l Corp.**, 23 P.3d 1214 (Colo. App. 2000); **Walford v. Blinder, Robinson & Co.**, 793 P.2d 620 (Colo. App. 1990) (judicially enforceable arbitration proceedings may form basis for malicious prosecution action). In such a case, this instruction (and, when necessary, any of the remaining instructions in this Part A) must be appropriately modified. For other forms of abuse of process, the instructions in Part B of this chapter should be used rather than this instruction.

2. In cases involving multiple defendants or designated nonparties where the pro rata liability statute, § 13-21-111.5, C.R.S., is applicable, see Notes on Use to Instruction 4:20.

3. Omit any numbered paragraphs, the facts of which are not in dispute.

4. In appropriate cases, the language in numbered paragraph 4 should read: “If the complaint was filed with probable cause, the defendant continued to prosecute the criminal action after (*insert applicable pronoun*) no longer had probable cause to believe the plaintiff guilty.”

5. If the defendant has put no affirmative defense in issue or there is insufficient evidence to support a defense, the last two paragraphs should be omitted.

6. Though mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense, *see* Instruction 5:2, only rarely, if ever, when established will it be a complete defense. For this reason, mitigation should not be identified as an affirmative defense in the concluding paragraphs of this instruction. Instead, if supported by sufficient evidence, Instruction 5:2 should be given along with the actual damages instruction appropriate to the claim and the evidence in the case.

7. Other appropriate instructions defining the terms used in this instruction, such as Instruction 17:2, defining “probable cause,” must also be given with this instruction.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by **Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pherson**, 129 Colo. 502, 272 P.2d 643 (1954). *See also* **Hewitt**, 154 P.3d at 411 (citing this instruction); **Thompson**, 84 P.3d at 503; **Louder v. Jacobs**, 119 Colo. 511, 205 P.2d 236 (1949); **Wigger v. McKee**, 809 P.2d 999 (Colo. App. 1990) (action for malicious prosecution requires proof that plaintiff was prosecuted without probable cause); **B & K Distrib., Inc. v. Drake Bldg. Corp.**, 654 P.2d 324 (Colo. App. 1982) (lack of probable cause is necessary requirement of liability); **Sancetta v. Apollo Stereo Music Co.**, 44 Colo. App. 292, 616 P.2d 182 (1980) (citing this instruction).

2. In **McDonald v. Lakewood Country Club**, 170 Colo. 355, 363, 461 P.2d 437, 441 (1969), the court adopted the rule that “prosecuting attorneys are not liable in a civil action for malicious prosecution where they act in their official capacity, even though they act with malice and without probable cause. . . . This privilege does not embrace a situation of a prosecutor acting clearly outside the duties of his office.” The privilege accorded in **McDonald** to prosecuting attorneys does not extend to other administrative officials such as brand inspectors. **Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Kolar**, 30 Colo. App. 1, 488 P.2d 1114 (1971).

3. For a further discussion of an official’s immunity as a prosecutor in the context of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2024), see **Higgs v. District Court**, 713 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1985).

4. In **Wagner v. Board of County Commissioners**, 933 P.2d 1311 (Colo. 1997), the court held that plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution based solely upon the defendant’s grand jury testimony was properly dismissed by the trial court because a witness before a grand jury is absolutely immune from civil liability for his or her testimony even if such testimony is knowingly false and malicious. *But see* **Wolf v. Brenneman**, 2024 COA 71, ¶ 50, 557 P.3d 798 (malicious prosecution defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity for statements made to law enforcement in reporting a crime).

5. The plaintiff does not have to prove that he or she received a not guilty verdict. However, the plaintiff must prove a termination of the case in his or her favor. In **Hewitt**, 154 P.3d at 416, the court held that a favorable termination of the case must be a resolution on the merits, determined as a matter of law, and rejected a totality-of-the-circumstances examination for deciding the issue. *See also* **Bell Lumber Co. v. Graham**, 74 Colo. 149, 219 P. 777 (1923) (voluntary settlement is not a favorable termination for purposes of malicious prosecution claim); **Schenck v. Minolta Office Sys., Inc.**, 802 P.2d 1131 (Colo. App. 1990); **Land v. Hill**, 644 P.2d 43 (Colo. App. 1981). Nor is a dismissal “in the interest of justice” at the prosecution’s request sufficient unless the facts demonstrate that the dismissal represented a favorable determination on the merits of the case. **Allen v. City of Aurora**, 892 P.2d 333 (Colo. App. 1994).

6. There is no requirement of a favorable termination where the claim is as to ex parte proceedings. **Hewitt**, 154 P.3d at 410; **Thompson**, 84 P.3d at 505. A claim based on improper filing of a lis pendens is not an ex parte proceeding. **Hewitt**, 154 P.3d at 416.

7. For purposes of complying with the 180-day notice required under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, see § 24-10-109, C.R.S., a claim for malicious prosecution accrues on the date when the claimant is aware that allegedly improper charges had been filed against him. *See* **Masters v. Castrodale**, 121 P.3d 362 (Colo. App. 2005).

17:2 PROBABLE CAUSE — DEFINED

Probable cause means that the defendant, (*name*), in good faith believed, and that a reasonable person, under the same or similar circumstances, would also have believed, that the plaintiff, (*name*), was guilty of the offense with which (*insert applicable pronoun*) was charged.

Notes on Use

1. Note 1 of Notes on Use to Instruction 17:1 is also applicable to this instruction.
2. Whenever this instruction is given, Instruction 17:3 should also be given.
3. This instruction should be given only if the facts and circumstances relied upon as constituting “lack of probable cause” are in dispute. Where there is no factual dispute, the question is one of law to be resolved by the court and the court should, if it finds “lack of probable cause” to exist, instruct the jury accordingly.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by **Konas v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.**, 158 Colo. 29, 404 P.2d 546 (1965). *See also* **Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pherson**, 129 Colo. 502, 272 P.2d 643 (1954); **Gurley v. Tomkins**, 17 Colo. 437, 30 P. 344 (1892).

2. “Probable cause requires that the defendant believed ‘in good faith in the wrongful conduct of the plaintiff in the underlying action, and that such belief was reasonable and prudent.’” **Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst.**, 2022 COA 109M, ¶ 27, 522 P.3d 242 (quoting **Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pherson**, 129 Colo. 502, 508, 272 P.2d 643, 646 (1954)) (cleaned up). “Probable cause is judged by appearances to the defendant at the time he initiates prosecution.” *Id.*, p 27 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119, at 876 (5th ed. 1984)).

17:3 PROBABLE CAUSE NOT DEPENDENT ON RESULT OF CRIMINAL CASE

The fact that the criminal case (may have) ended in favor of the plaintiff, (name), does not in itself prove a lack of probable cause.

Notes on Use

1. Note 1 of the Notes on Use to Instruction 17:1 is also applicable to this instruction.
2. When Instruction 17:2 is given, this instruction should also be given.
3. Use the parenthetical phrase “may have” if there is a dispute as to how the criminal case ended.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by **Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pherson**, 129 Colo. 502, 272 P.2d 643 (1954). *See also* **Flader v. Smith**, 116 Colo. 322, 181 P.2d 464 (1947); **Climax Dairy Co. v. Mulder**, 78 Colo. 407, 242 P. 666 (1925); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 667(2) (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119 (5th ed. 1984).

2. In civil cases, a court’s denial of a summary judgment or directed verdict motion does not create a rebuttable presumption that probable cause existed for the claims challenged in the denied motion but is merely a factor to consider in evaluating whether probable cause existed for those claims. When determining how much weight to give the denial order, other factors to consider include the type of order, whether the order included many details, whether the order addressed all elements of all claims, at what point in the litigation the order was issued, whether the court commented on the strength of the evidence, whether parties assert that false or misleading evidence was used in defeating the motion, whether any relevant testimony was later determined to be materially false, whether perjury or fraud were alleged to have occurred, and whether the parties had completed discovery at the time of the order. **Cantafio v. Schnelle**, 2025 CO 39, ¶¶ 25, 29-30, 569 P.3d 1226.

17:4 PRESENCE OF MALICE

The defendant, *(name)*, was motivated by malice if *(insert applicable pronoun)* primary motive was a motive other than a desire to bring to justice a person *(insert applicable pronoun)* thought had committed a crime.

Notes on Use

1. Note 1 of the Notes on Use to Instruction 17:1 is also applicable to this instruction.
2. Whenever this instruction is given, Instruction 17:5 should also be given.
3. This instruction must be appropriately modified if there is a dispute as to whether the defendant made the statements that caused the criminal case to be brought against the plaintiff.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by **Suchey v. Stiles**, 155 Colo. 363, 394 P.2d 739 (1964); **Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pherson**, 129 Colo. 502, 272 P.2d 643 (1954); **Louder v. Jacobs**, 119 Colo. 511, 205 P.2d 236 (1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 668 (1977); and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119 (5th ed. 1984).

17:5 PROOF OF MALICE

A lack of probable cause may indicate malice. However, before you find malice based on a lack of probable cause, you must consider all the circumstances surrounding the filing and prosecution of the criminal case.

Notes on Use

1. Note 1 of the Notes on Use to Instruction 17:1 is also applicable to this instruction.
2. This instruction should be given whenever Instruction 17:4 is given.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by **Koch v. Wright**, 67 Colo. 292, 184 P. 363 (1919). *See also Sancetta v. Apollo Stereo Music Co.*, 44 Colo. App. 292, 616 P.2d 182 (1980); **Florence Oil & Ref. Co. v. Huff**, 14 Colo. App. 281, 59 P. 624 (1900); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 669 (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119 (5th ed. 1984).

17:6 LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE NOT TO BE INFERRED FROM MALICE ALONE

Malice alone is not enough to prove lack of probable cause.

Notes on Use

1. Note 1 of the Notes on Use to Instruction 17:1 is also applicable to this instruction.
2. This instruction should be given whenever Instructions 17:2 and 17:4 are given.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by **O'Malley-Kelley Oil & Auto Supply Co. v. Gates Oil Co.**, 73 Colo. 140, 214 P. 398 (1923); **Gurley v. Tomkins**, 17 Colo. 437, 30 P. 344 (1892); and **W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119** (5th ed. 1984).

17:7 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE — ADVICE OF ATTORNEY

The defendant, *(name)*, is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, *(name)*, on *(insert applicable pronoun)* claim of malicious prosecution if you find that the defendant has proved the affirmative defense of advice of attorney. This affirmative defense is proved if you find all of the following:

1. The defendant made a full, fair, and honest disclosure to an attorney of all the facts the defendant knew or reasonably should have known concerning the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff;

2. The attorney (advised the defendant that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff may have committed a crime) (or) (recommended the defendant take the action that was a cause of the criminal case being brought against the plaintiff); and

3. The defendant acted in good faith on the attorney's advice in causing the case to be brought against the plaintiff.

Notes on Use

1. Note 1 of the Notes on Use to Instruction 17:1 is also applicable to this instruction.
2. Use whichever parenthesized phrases are appropriate.
3. Advice of counsel is an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the burden of proof.
4. This instruction is not applicable unless the lawyer consulted is disinterested. **Smith v. Hensley**, 107 Colo. 180, 109 P.2d 909 (1941); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119 (5th ed. 1984).

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by **Montgomery Ward & Co v. Pherson**, 129 Colo. 502, 272 P.2d 643 (1954); **Van Meter v. Bass**, 40 Colo. 78, 90 P. 637 (1907); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 666 (1977); and PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, *supra*, § 119. *See also Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail*, 183 P.3d 582 (Colo. App. 2007) (reliance on advice of counsel is affirmative defense to malicious prosecution); W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, *Reliance on Advice of Prosecuting Attorney as Defense to Malicious Prosecution Action*, 10 A.L.R.2d 1215 (1950).

17:8 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE — ADVICE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

The defendant, *(name)*, is not legally responsible to the plaintiff, *(name)*, on *(insert applicable pronoun)* claim of malicious prosecution if you find that the defendant has proved the affirmative defense of advice of a prosecuting attorney. This affirmative defense is proved if you find all of the following:

1. The defendant made a full, fair, and honest disclosure to a prosecuting attorney of all the facts the defendant knew or reasonably should have known concerning the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff;

2. On the basis of these facts, the prosecuting attorney determined there were reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff may have committed a crime; and

3. The prosecuting attorney (brought) (advised bringing) the criminal case against the plaintiff.

Notes on Use

1. Use whichever parenthesized words are appropriate.

2. Advice of a prosecuting attorney is an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the burden of proof.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by **Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pherson**, 129 Colo. 502, 272 P.2d 643 (1954); **Wyatt v. Burdette**, 43 Colo. 208, 95 P. 336 (1908); and **Van Meter v. Bass**, 40 Colo. 78, 90 P. 637 (1907). *See also* **B & K Distrib., Inc. v. Drake Bldg. Corp.**, 654 P.2d 324 (Colo. App. 1982); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119 (5th ed. 1984).

2. In support of the proposition that reliance on the advice of the prosecuting attorney is an affirmative defense, see **Antolovich v. Brown Group Retail, Inc.**, 183 P.3d 582 (Colo. App. 2007). *See also* W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, *Reliance on Advice of Prosecuting Attorney as Defense to Malicious Prosecution Action*, 10 A.L.R.2d 1215 (1950).

17:9 ACTUAL DAMAGES

Plaintiff, (name), has the burden of proving the nature and extent of (insert applicable pronoun) damages by a preponderance of the evidence. If you find in favor of the plaintiff, you must determine the total dollar amount of the plaintiff's damages, if any, that were caused by the malicious prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant(s), (name(s)), (and) (the [insert appropriate description, e.g., "negligence"], if any, of any designated nonparties).

In determining these damages, you shall consider the following:

1. Any noneconomic losses or injuries the plaintiff has had to the present time or that the plaintiff will probably have in the future, including: physical and mental pain and suffering, fear, anxiety, humiliation, embarrassment, indignity, public disgrace, and any loss to plaintiff's reputation which were caused by the malicious prosecution.

2. Any economic losses or injuries the plaintiff has had to the present time or that the plaintiff will probably have in the future, including: court costs, reasonable attorney fees and any other reasonable expenses which the plaintiff has had in defending (insert applicable pronoun) in the criminal case against (insert applicable pronoun), a reasonable amount for the time the plaintiff necessarily lost in preparing for and in attending the trial of the criminal case, loss of income, damage to (insert applicable pronoun) business, (and) (insert any other items of special damage of which there is sufficient evidence) which were caused by the malicious prosecution.

Notes on Use

1. Notes on Use to Instruction 6:1 and Notes 1 and 2 of Notes on Use to Instruction 17:1 are also applicable to this instruction.

2. The appropriate instruction relating to causation, *see* Instructions 9:18–9:21, should also be given with this instruction.

3. Use whichever parenthesized words are appropriate.

4. Omit any particular element of damages for which there is insufficient evidence to support a jury finding. Note, however, that in a malicious prosecution suit based on a criminal proceeding, an inference or presumption of injury to the plaintiff's reputation and of the existence of humiliation and hurt feelings may be based on the occurrence of the criminal proceeding alone. *See Bernstein v. Simon*, 77 Colo. 193, 235 P. 375 (1925) (as to injured reputation); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119 (5th ed. 1984).

5. Because "the elements of the torts of intentional interference with contract and malicious prosecution are not the same[,] the damages caused by the conduct constituting each tort may not be identical." *Westfield Dev. Co. v. Rifle Inv. Assocs.*, 786 P.2d 1112, 1119 (Colo.

1990). Therefore, when both torts are involved in the same suit, the factfinder should make specific findings of fact with respect to the damages for each.

6. Comparative negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort claim. **Carman v. Heber**, 43 Colo. App. 5, 601 P.2d 646 (1979). Therefore, the first paragraph of this instruction varies from the comparable damage instructions in “simple” negligence cases by eliminating any reference to plaintiff’s own negligence.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by **Murphy v. Hobbs**, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884). *See also* **Bernstein**, 77 Colo. at 195-96, 235 P. at 376 (attorney fees and loss of reputation); **Johnston v. Deideshimer**, 76 Colo. 559, 232 P. 1113 (1925); **Exch. Nat’l Bank v. Cullum**, 114 Colo. 26, 161 P.2d 336 (1945); **Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Kolar**, 30 Colo. App. 1, 408 P.2d 1114 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 670-71 (1977); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, *supra*, § 119.

B. ABUSE OF PROCESS

17:10 ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY

For the plaintiff, *(name)*, to recover from the defendant, *(name)*, on *(insert applicable pronoun)* claim of abuse of process, you must find that all of the following have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence:

- 1. The defendant, *(name)*, *(describe legal proceeding, e.g., “filed a lawsuit”)*;**
- 2. The defendant had an ulterior purpose for *(describe the legal proceeding)*;**
- 3. The defendant willfully used the *(describe legal proceeding)* in an improper manner to *(insert description of alleged ulterior purpose)*; and**
- 4. The defendant’s action was a cause of the plaintiff’s *(injuries)* *(damages)* *(losses)*.**

If you find that one or more of these statements has not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

On the other hand, if you find that all of these statements have been proved, *(then your verdict must be for the plaintiff)* *(then you must consider the defendant’s affirmative defense(s) of [insert any affirmative defense that would be a complete defense to plaintiff’s claim])*.

If you find that *(this affirmative defense has)* *(any one or more of these affirmative defenses have)* been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

However, if you find that *(this affirmative defense has not)* *(none of these affirmative defenses have)* been proved, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff.

Notes on Use

1. Omit any numbered paragraph, the facts of which are not in dispute.
2. In cases involving multiple defendants or designated nonparties where the pro rata liability statute, § 13-21-111.5, C.R.S., is applicable, see the Notes on Use to Instruction 4:20.
3. If the defendant has put no affirmative defense in issue or if there is insufficient evidence to support such a defense, the last two paragraphs should be omitted.
4. Instruction 17:12 (defining ulterior purpose) should be given with this instruction.

Source and Authority

1. This instruction is supported by **Parks v. Edward Dale Parrish LLC**, 2019 COA 19, ¶ 12, 452 P.3d 141; **Mackall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank**, 2014 COA 120, ¶ 39, 356 P.3d 946;

Colo. Cmty. Bank v. Hoffman, 2013 COA 146, ¶ 37, 338 P.3d 390; **Mintz v. Accident & Injury Medical Specialists, PC**, 284 P.3d 62 (Colo. App. 2010), *aff'd on other grounds*, 2012 CO 50, 279 P.3d 658. *See also* **Hewitt v. Rice**, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007).

2. The abuse of process tort arose to provide a remedy where the malicious prosecution tort did not, namely where a legal procedure has been set in motion in proper form but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed. **Mintz**, 284 P.3d at 65-66. Thus, unlike the tort of malicious prosecution, for the plaintiff to establish a claim for abuse of process, it is not necessary to prove that the proceedings in which the process was used terminated in the plaintiff's favor, or that the process was obtained or proceedings started without probable cause. **Coulter v. Coulter**, 73 Colo. 144, 214 P. 400 (1923).

3. To establish a claim for abuse of process, the plaintiff must show (1) an ulterior purpose in the use of a judicial proceeding; (2) willful action by the defendant in the use of that process which is not proper in the regular course of the proceedings, i.e., use of a legal proceeding in an improper manner; and (3) resulting damage. **Parks**, ¶ 13, 452 P.3d at 145; **Mackall**, ¶ 39, 356 P.3d at 954; **Lauren Corp. v. Century Geophysical Corp.**, 953 P.2d 200, 202 (Colo. App. 1988).

4. As to the second element, an ulterior purpose is one that the legal proceeding was not designed to accomplish. **Mintz**, 284 P.3d at 66. Usually, the ulterior purpose is to obtain an advantage in another matter to achieve the surrender of property or the payment of money. *Id.*; **Walker v. Van Laningham**, 148 P.3d 391, 394 (Colo. App. 2006) ("The improper purpose is ordinarily an attempt to secure from another some collateral advantage not properly includable in the process itself and is a form of extortion in which a lawfully used process is perverted to an unlawful use." (citation omitted)).

5. As to the third element, there must also be some allegation that, viewed objectively, the judicial process is being used in an improper manner. There is no valid claim for abuse of process if the defendant's ulterior purpose was simply incidental to the proceeding's proper purpose. **Parks**, ¶ 13, 452 P.3d at 145; **Mintz**, 284 P.3d at 66. "The essential element of an abuse of process claim is the use of the legal proceeding in an improper manner; therefore, an improper use of the process must be established." **Active Release Techniques, LLC v. Xtomix, LLC**, 2017 COA 14, ¶ 6, 413 P.3d 210, 212 (quoting **Sterenbuch v. Goss**, 266 P.3d 428 (Colo. App. 2011)). Although subjective motive is important in determining whether there was an ulterior purpose, it must also be established that, viewed objectively, there was an improper use of legal process. **Walker**, 148 P.3d at 394; *see also* **Hewitt**, 154 P.3d at 414 (distinguishing between abuse of process and malicious prosecution); **Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. King**, 97 P.3d 161 (Colo. App. 2003) (use of judicial process against wife to obtain money from husband is not a legitimate objective for that process). Although an ulterior motive may be inferred from the wrongful use of process, the wrongful use may not be inferred from the motive. **Hoffman**, ¶ 38, 338 P.3d at 397 (even if evidence allowed an inference that the sole intent was to divest defendants of their ownership interests in property, this evidence would establish only that the intervenors had an ulterior motive in bringing the action, and does not establish the requisite improper use of process).

6. When a claim for abuse of process is based on the use of a process that constitutes the exercise by the defendant of a First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, plaintiff must meet a “heightened standard” sufficient to show that the defendant’s petitioning activities were not immunized from liability under the First Amendment. **Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. District Court**, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) (“POME”); *see also* **General Steel Domestic Sales v. Bacheller**, 2012 CO 68, ¶ 26, 291 P.3d 1. Specifically, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant’s administrative or judicial claims were devoid of reasonable factual support or . . . lacked any cognizable basis in law for their assertion; and (2) the primary purpose of the defendant’s petitioning activity was to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other improper objective; and (3) the defendant’s petitioning activity had the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.” **POME**, 677 P.2d at 1369. This standard applies when the abuse challenged involves the filing of a lawsuit, as the “right to petition extends to all departments of the Government,” and “[t]he right of access to the courts is . . . but one aspect of the right of petition.” **Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited**, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); *accord* **General Steel**, ¶ 23.

7. The heightened standard articulated in **POME** does not apply where the alleged abuse of process involves a purely private as opposed to a public dispute. **Boyer v. Health Grades, Inc.**, 2015 CO 40, ¶ 15, 359 P.3d 25, 29 (finding the heightened standard articulated in **POME** “to be inapplicable to a resort to administrative or judicial process implicating purely private disputes” in suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade secrets against former employees of plaintiff); **General Steel**, ¶ 32, 291 P.3d at 9 (declining to extend the heightened standard articulated in **POME** where the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint in a purely private dispute); *cf.* **L.S.S. v. S.A.P.**, 2022 COA 123, ¶ 53, 523 P.3d 1280 (recognizing that ancillary claims alleging a false claim of child abuse and extreme and outrageous conduct are subject to the same constitutional standards as a defamation claim involving a matter of public concern). *But see* **In re Foster**, 253 P.3d 1244 (Colo. 2011) (concluding that First Amendment and due process concerns identified in **POME** are equally applicable in the context of an attorney discipline case as they are in a civil case).

8. Malice is not an essential element for liability for abuse of process. **Martinez v. Cont’l Enter.**, 697 P.2d 789 (Colo. App. 1984), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds*, 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986). It is sufficient if the defendant’s principal purpose was other than a proper legal one. **Salstrom v. Starke**, 670 P.2d 809 (Colo. App. 1983) (jury could reasonably have found plaintiff liable on counterclaim for abuse of process for having intentionally filed, for an “ulterior purpose,” lis pendens notice that caused the defendant damage).

17:11 ACTUAL DAMAGES

Plaintiff, (name), has the burden of proving the nature and extent of (insert applicable pronoun) damages by a preponderance of the evidence. If you find in favor of the plaintiff, you must determine the total dollar amount of the plaintiff's damages, if any, that were caused by the abuse of process by the defendant(s), (name(s)), (and) (the [insert appropriate description, e.g., "negligence"], if any, of any designated nonparties).

In determining these damages, you shall consider the following:

1. Any noneconomic losses or injuries the plaintiff has had to the present time or that the plaintiff will probably have in the future, including: any physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, fear, anxiety, humiliation, embarrassment, indignity, and public disgrace, and any loss to the plaintiff's reputation which were caused by the abuse of process.

2. Any economic losses or injuries the plaintiff has had to the present time or that the plaintiff will probably have in the future, including: court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and any other reasonable expenses the plaintiff has had in defending (insert applicable pronoun) in any (proceeding) (or) (trial) against (insert applicable pronoun), (and) a reasonable amount for the time (insert applicable pronoun) lost in preparing for and in attending the proceeding or trial of the case, loss of income, damage to (insert applicable pronoun) business, (and) (insert any other items of special damage of which there is sufficient evidence) which were caused by the abuse of process.

Notes on Use

1. Notes on Use to Instruction 17:9 are also applicable to this instruction.
2. Comparative negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort claim. **Carman v. Heber**, 43 Colo. App. 5, 601 P.2d 646 (1979). Therefore, the first paragraph of this instruction varies from the comparable damages instructions in "simple" negligence cases by eliminating any reference to plaintiff's own negligence.

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by **Hewitt v. Rice**, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007). *See also* **Tech. Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Buckley**, 844 P.2d 1249 (Colo. App. 1992) (plaintiff may recover attorney fees incurred in defending against earlier litigation wrongfully instituted by defendant); **W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 121** (5th ed. 1984); Source and Authority to Instruction 17:9.

17:12 ULTERIOR PURPOSE — DEFINED

An ulterior purpose is one that the legal proceeding was not designed to accomplish.

Notes on Use

This instruction should be given with Instruction 17:10 (elements of liability for abuse of process).

Source and Authority

This instruction is supported by **Mintz v. Accident & Injury Medical Specialists, PC**, 284 P.3d 62, 66 (Colo. App. 2010) (“an ulterior purpose is one that the legal proceeding was not designed to accomplish”), *aff’d on other grounds*, 2012 CO 50, 279 P.3d 658. *See also Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. King*, 97 P.3d 161 (Colo. App. 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 cmt. b (1977).